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What's New:

December 15, 2009:
Annual Report

Moving forward: better transport for city regions

1. Introduction
2. Background
3. Further research
     Performance
     Legislative powers
 4. What should a strategic metropolitan transport authority look like?
     Strategic objectives
     Functional delivery
     Funding
     Local and regional transport planning
     Governance
 5. Conclusions and recommendations

Annex 1. Performance
Annex 2. Summary of legislative powers and duties of Passenger Transport Authorities/Executives and metropolitan districts

1. Introduction

1.1 During its 2006/7 work programme, the Commission for Integrated Transport (CfIT) completed its review of Integrating Transport Delivery across Government Departments which, amongst other conclusions, recommended the creation of strategic transport authorities in the English 'City Region' conurbations outside London and committed itself to further work in this area to more fully define the shape, scope, roles and responsibilities that such a body might have. This report builds on this work (and other recently published important policy documents including the Eddington Transport Study, the Local Government White Paper and the Putting Passengers First Department for Transport Green Paper on the future of the bus industry) to fulfil that commitment.

2. Background

2.1 Over the last few years, there has been an increasing recognition that transport is fundamental to the continuing prosperity and social well-being of our Metropolitan areas, and that the conurbations themselves are, in turn, major drivers of national economic growth. Expanding economic activity within city regional centres is, however, demanding ever greater access to employment markets, whilst increasing prosperity and car ownership is contributing to declining bus patronage, increasing congestion levels and growing air quality problems.

2.2 Aside from in London where, through massively increased investment, considerable progress has been made in breaking this cycle of declining public transport usage, increasing congestion and worsening pollution, generally other City Regions have struggled to make an impact on this increasingly significant problem. Bus patronage in London has increased by up to 7% per annum over the last few years whilst traffic volumes have remained static, delivering a 4% reduction in car-based modal share and a 30% reduction in congestion in central London. However, in the same period, the six English Metropolitan areas (West Midlands, Greater Manchester, Merseyside, West Yorkshire, South Yorkshire and Tyne & Wear) have collectively averaged a 4% per annum decline in bus use, and seen a 7% increase in traffic volumes, together with consequential increases in car based modal share and traffic congestion.

2.3 Whilst there are many reasons why the capital is not a directly comparable model against which to judge progress in the other English City Regions (including greater investment levels, differing governance structures and the overall economic strength and resources of a major 'world city'), nationally London is not alone in having delivered such progress. In larger urban areas like Nottingham, Brighton and Reading, as well as smaller to medium sized towns like York, Cambridge and Telford, similar results have been achieved, often without the scale of investment seen in London.

2.4 In its recently completed review (November 2006) of Integrating Transport Delivery - Is it Working across Government Departments?, CfIT concluded that there was a direct relationship between the degree of functional integration of local authority governance and delivery of key strategic transport powers (e.g. public transport provision, local strategic road management, parking enforcement, taxi licensing etc.), and the achievement of results around the country.

2.5 The Commission observed that, regardless of size or scale, the common link between all of the successful areas identified was the existence of a single strategic body integrating transport and highway powers (as well as economic development and land use planning) across a unified local transport planning area. Within the Metropolitan areas however, the situation was fundamentally different because these responsibilities were split up within the local transport planning area.

2.6 Whilst the unitary and 'two tier' examples identified showed that a deregulated public transport market was not in itself an impediment to successful transport delivery, CfIT concluded that the cumulative effect of the separation of strategic highways management, economic development, land use planning, strategic public transport planning and commercial service delivery in the Metropolitan areas, represented a significant barrier to successful delivery.

2.7 The Commission therefore recommended that functional bodies with a coherent set of highways and transport powers were needed in the conurbations, and was supportive of a 'city region wide' approach to the development of strategic transport authorities in the Metropolitan areas, with powers equivalent to those of the existing PTA/PTEs, but also including strategic transport planning, highway authority management of the local strategic road network, traffic control, parking enforcement and taxi licensing.

2.8 Since this time, the Eddington Transport Study has also reached conclusions along much the same lines, observing:

2.9 Eddington goes on to recommend that the Government should consider "To what extent powers should be vested in a single decision-making body at the sub-national level, including, for example, highways and traffic powers over local strategic roads, including road pricing; and powers for buses."

2.10 Since this time, the Department for Transport has also published its Putting Passengers First Green Paper, outlining its current thinking on the future of the bus industry. Building on the Department for Communities and Local Government's (DCLG) recent Local Government White Paper which "established a clear principle that greater powers for local authorities need to be accompanied by stronger clearer leadership", it states that the forthcoming draft Road Transport Bill "will facilitate reform of the Passenger Transport Authorities and Executives to enable a more coherent approach to transport in our major cities."

2.11 This paper therefore seeks to build on these developments and attempts to outline a workable model for a possible future strategic Metropolitan transport authority which combines the need for strategic thinking, dynamic leadership and integrated transport delivery on a conurbation wide scale, with the principles of local accountability and community governance set out in the Local Government White Paper.

3. Further research

3.1 To aid it in this work, CfIT commissioned two further pieces of research:

  1. A detailed transport performance outcomes comparison between London, the Metropolitan Conurbations and the largest non-Metropolitan 'unitary' authority areas, covering total urban populations of approximately 7.4m, 10.8m and 3.5m respectively.
  2. A legislative review of the current powers, duties and responsibilities of the local Highway, Traffic and Transport Authorities and Passenger Transport Authorities/Executives within the Metropolitan areas.

The findings of these two reviews are set out in Annexes 1 and 2, under separate cover, however their main conclusions may be summarised as follows:

Performance

3.2 This first piece of work looked at both individual Local Transport Plan (LTP) areas and the collective performance of local authorities under each of the three governance types (Unitaries, Mets and London), including assessments of bus performance and patronage growth, road safety, traffic growth, cycling development, highway maintenance and (where relevant) overall LTP annual progress report results; and considered these in relation to demographics and relative funding levels (both capital and revenue) in each area.

3.3 In terms of absolute outcomes, in most areas London has consistently out-performed both the Metropolitan conurbations and the Unitary[1] authorities over the last three years. However, although impressive, there are number of reasons why this performance is perhaps not directly comparable. Chief amongst these is the greater level of funding invested in transport in London, with overall capital and revenue expenditure nearly double per capita that in the Metropolitan areas. However, there are also a number of other factors that appear to have benefited the capital including: stable and now lower levels of car ownership (compared to rising ownership in both the Mets and Unitary areas); higher (and therefore easier) baseline road safety figures; and lower baseline customer satisfaction statistics for bus services.

3.4 With broadly comparable levels of overall expenditure, direct comparisons between the Metropolitan and unitary areas are perhaps more meaningful. Although there is wide variation between the best and the worst individual authorities, overall the Unitary areas clearly out-perform Metropolitan ones in bus development, traffic growth management, cycling and overall LTP delivery.

3.5 Whilst, again, there are some mitigating circumstances which go some way towards explaining this, (including slightly higher growth in car ownership, lower (easier) baseline figures for bus satisfaction and more stable bus operating costs), these are not considered sufficient to explain the scale of overall difference in performance, suggesting that governance and structural arrangements may have had an impact on delivery. Indeed other factors suggest that performance in the Metropolitan areas could be expected to be higher than that for the Unitaries, including higher expenditure levels per head of population and per km of road length. Bus performance in the Unitaries areas also stands up well compared to London (when considered in relation to both population density and traffic density), with the Metropolitan areas lagging well behind.

3.6 In terms of maintenance and road safety, the review identified little difference in performance between the unitaries and Metropolitan areas, suggesting that a lack of strategic conurbation/'travel to work area' wide direction has proportionally less impact on these more locally delivered services.

Legislative powers

3.7 Along with general local government legislation, the law governing local transport delivery largely revolves around that defining local authority roles as Highway, Traffic and Transport Authorities. The main pieces of primary legislation relating to these functions are: The Highways Act 1980; the Transport Acts of 1968, 1985 and 2000; the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984; the New Roads and Streetworks Act 1991; the Traffic Management Act 2004 and various Local Government Acts from 1972 onwards.

3.8 In order to better understand the existing opportunities and barriers to delivery, a review was undertaken of the legislative powers, duties and responsibilities in each of the three types of local authority area see Annex 2 under separate cover). These vary considerably.

3.9 In London, although the form and structure of local government is somewhat different to the rest of the country, the same basic Highway, Traffic and Transport Authority functions apply. Broadly speaking, Transport for London is the Transport Authority for the whole of the capital, operating a regulated bus market; tendering for services and able to determine routes, frequencies, fares, quality of provision and retain farebox income. Highways and traffic powers are split between it and the London Boroughs. TfL is responsible for the 'Transport for London Road Network' (the TLRN - approximately 580km of the most heavily used strategic roads carrying around a third of the city's traffic) and the Boroughs are responsible for the rest. TfL is also responsible for all traffic lights and has additional traffic management powers that give it some influence over works on non-TfL roads that might have an impact on traffic flows on the TLRN.

3.10 In the Unitary areas, as their name would suggest, all of the relevant powers are contained within the single authority. Unlike in London, the public transport (bus) market is unregulated, with private operators having the ability to determine what services they wish to run (and retain farebox income). However the unitary district (city) councils are Highways, Traffic and Transport Authorities for all the roads and transport in their areas.

3.11 In the Metropolitan areas, the structure is much more fragmented. Whilst the Passenger Transport Authorities (PTAs) are Transport Authorities for the whole of their areas (again operating within an unregulated bus market), unlike in London, they have no strategic highways and traffic powers at all. These are all the responsibility of the Metropolitan district councils. It is this fractured structure and the lack of a single body responsible for overseeing strategic highways, traffic and transport delivery that has been commented upon both by CfIT and the Eddington Study as being, at least in part, responsible for the perceived failure of the Metropolitan areas to collectively deliver the same transport outcomes seen in both London and the more successful non-Metropolitan Unitary areas.

3.12 The situation is further aggravated by the status of the PTAs. The unitary councils and metropolitan districts are 'local authorities' within the meaning of the Local Government Act 1972 (and subsequent amendments) which governs what local authorities can and can't do and, in particular, gives them powers to borrow money 'prudentially' and a general power of well being to undertake any activity they deem to be in the social, economic or environmental interests of the community they represent. The PTAs on the other hand are not 'local authorities' fully within the meaning of this Act and can therefore only undertake duties and responsibilities specifically assigned to them in legislation.

3.13 Creating (or developing the existing PTAs into) strategic transport authorities for the metropolitan areas will therefore require some form of primary legislation. Although a number of different approaches could be taken, they largely fall into two broad categories: Firstly a 'top down' approach could be used, creating a new conurbation-wide strategic Highway, Traffic and Transport Authority, and then delegating back down to the Metropolitan districts (through agency agreements or other arrangements) the powers and delivery functions of primarily local significance. Alternatively, a 'bottom up' approach could be taken, drawing from the metropolitan districts (and potentially the Highways Agency) those powers over certain elements of the road network necessary to create an effective strategic transport authority.

3.14 In either case the strategic transport authority created could either be a development of the existing Passenger Transport Authority (with 'full' Local Government Act local authority powers), or an entirely new body. The remainder of this paper therefore deals with issues and priorities that might determine the role, objectives, form, function, financing and governance of such a body.

4. What should a strategic metropolitan transport authority look like?

4.1 CfIT's earlier work (Integrating Transport Delivery Across Government Departments) identified five main aspects of integration:

4.2 Whilst all are important to the achievement transport outcomes (strong leadership in particular being a pre-requisite for successful governance arrangements), as stated previously, the Commission identified a clear correlation between results and the degree of functional integration. This section therefore looks first at what the strategic objectives of a possible future metropolitan strategic transport authority should be and the powers, duties and functional responsibilities likely to be needed for successful delivery before returning to questions of funding, local transport planning and the political governance arrangements necessary to oversee their implementation.

Strategic objectives

4.3 Before attempting to identify what powers and delivery responsibilities a future strategic authority might need, one first needs to be clear about what its key objectives should be. To answer this one needs to consider the Government's overall priorities and objectives for the City Regions.

4.4 In doing this it immediately becomes clear that, whilst environmental objectives are increasingly important to the Government's overall ambitions in the City Regions, it is economic and social considerations that are the most significant with respect to the role and structure of local transport delivery. This is enshrined in Treasury's assertion that it is the City Regions that will be the main drivers of national economic growth over the coming years; is reflected in the Department of Transport's focus on congestion management and its link to productivity in it's own departmental objectives; and is reinforced by the conclusions and recommendations of the Eddington Study, jointly commissioned by the two departments.

4.5 With five of the current six English Metropolitan areas being in the North, this is also further strengthened through the Government's commitment to the Northern Way initiative and its objective of narrowing the £30bn gap between the North and the English GVA average. CfIT therefore believes that, whilst other objectives will of course remain important to the overall objectives of any future strategic transport authority, congestion management and access to jobs and services should be the overriding objectives around which the structure of any future organisation should be primarily based.

Functional delivery

4.6 It therefore follows that, in seeking to identify where powers and delivery responsibilities should lie, account needs to be taken of all functions and service delivery relevant to both congestion management and transport accessibility, using the principles of subsidiarity (that decisions should be taken at the lowest possible level commensurate with the achievement of these overall objectives). This is not to say that other objectives like safety or the environment are unimportant, or that they should not form an important part of the strategic objectives of any new body created. However, in terms of the definition and development of the form, structure, role and functions of a new strategic transport body, it should be the former that shape decision-making.

4.7 With regard to congestion management, CfIT believes that this should include all strategic highways, traffic and transport powers associated with:

4.8 In terms of accessibility, in addition to the above (and the dial-a-ride, concessionary travel, education and social service transport responsibilities already discharged by the existing PTE's on behalf of the districts), this would involve integrating taxi licensing and enforcement, community safety and, potentially, health related transport responsibilities.

4.9 As stated earlier there are, broadly speaking, two possible legislative ways to achieve this, either: identifying specific powers in specific Acts of Parliament for certain categories of road and transferring them into a new strategic body incorporating the existing powers of the PTAs, or; creating a new 'upper tier' strategic transport authority in the Metropolitan areas incorporating all of the main local authority transport powers, and then using the principles of subsidiarity to delegate back to the Metropolitan districts decision-making and implementation responsibilities on issues of primarily local significance (for example, road safety & local road maintenance).

4.10 Whilst the former approach is effectively that used in the creation of the Transport for London Road Network, CfIT's view is that, in the Metropolitan areas, it would be overly complex to attempt to specify individual powers on individual streets (or categories of streets). Apart from eliminating the ability to tailor a strategic road network to suit the public transport, as well as road traffic management needs of any individual conurbation, such an approach fails to create a clear strategic decision-making hierarchy. Even on the most strategic elements of the road network there are functions that might most appropriately be delivered at a local level (eg minor maintenance repairs, street cleansing etc); similarly, on the more minor elements of the unclassified road network, there may be issues of strategic transport significance (eg the wider implications of development control applications, or achieving better bus service penetration into residential areas).

4.11 This is one area where CfIT believes that the existing Transport for London model is not ideal. Through management of its extensive traffic signals system, TfL has some ability to manage (to a degree) traffic movement across the whole network, however it only exerts absolute control over 11% of the network (carrying a third of the total traffic flows). Whilst it also has overarching Traffic Management Act powers to prevent work taking place on the non-TfL network, and to facilitate/encourage investment in specific measures though its control of Local Implementation Plan (LIP) funding, it has no powers to compel strategically necessary works (eg priority measures) to be implemented on non TfL roads.

4.12 The latter approach of course implies the full integration of powers associated with the Highways Act (1980), Transport Acts (1985 & 2000), New Roads and Streetworks Act (1991), Traffic Management Act (2004) and sundry other local authority legislation into a new conurbation wide strategic highways, traffic and transport authority. Whilst this is a more radical approach, CfIT's view is that, given the lesser ability to manage traffic movements through traffic signals control, and the inevitably lesser financial resources likely to be available to any strategic Metropolitan transport authority outside of London, the ability to exert influence on the management and development of the whole road network will need to be proportionally greater. This approach would therefore potentially imply control of (some currently) Highways Agency roads where those roads primarily serve the travel to work area.

4.13 The corollary to this of course is that, in order to ensure that a principle of subsidiarity holds good (and avoid the possibility of over-centralised decision-making in the strategic body), effective delegation on more local issues is required. A strategic transport authority needs to concern itself primarily with the 'bigger picture' aspects of the functions outlined in paragraphs 4.7 & 4.8 (above), focussing on major project implementation, strategic road and public transport network management (potentially including future road user charging schemes and quality bus contracts) and funding. Any legislative reform to create or develop strategic transport authorities therefore also needs to require an effective scheme of delegation to ensure that day to day decision-making and delivery of those transport services of primarily local importance (e.g. day to day road maintenance and management issues) across the whole road network.

4.14 For some services, there may be a need for a dual level role, with overall policy, direction and funding coming from the strategic authority (e.g. for travel planning, highways development control, strategic (structural) maintenance and traffic management responsibilities), and physical service delivery continuing to take place at a local level.

4.15 As the creation of any future strategic transport authority is likely to be directly linked to the development of more radical demand management and public transport measures such as road user charging and quality bus contracts and require specific legislative change and/or the approval of the Secretary of State for Transport, CfIT recommends that any scheme of delegation should be agreed formally as part of these local arrangements.

Funding

4.16 Access to sufficient financial resources (both capital and revenue related) will be of crucial significance to the success of any reform of transport governance and delivery. This is a further area where significant differences currently exist between the London model, county/unitary structures and arrangements in the metropolitan areas, with perhaps the most significant being in the scale of relative expenditure. Per head of population, London spends twice the average total expenditure on transport of the other Metropolitan conurbations, and nearly three times that in non-Metropolitan towns and cities (see below).

Average Annual Expenditure per head of population (2001/02-2005/06)

Average Annual Expenditure per head of population (2001/02-2005/06)

Exp Data: LTP F2 and F3 Finance Forms; TfL Annual Report and Accounts
London Revenue figures for Concessionary Fares and Support to Operators taken from Transport Statistics GB (Table 6.14), to ensure LUL expenditure is excluded.

Average Annual Expenditure per head of population (2001/02-2005/06):

CapitalRevenueTotal
Unitary/Joint LTP Areas£31£59£89
Metropolitan LTP Areas£45£83£128
London (Excl. Underground)£35£221£256

4.17 This difference in expenditure is most marked in terms of revenue expenditure, with London spending nearly three times as much on revenue support (eg. bus services, concessionary travel etc) as the Metropolitan areas. Capital expenditure (excluding Underground expenditure), on the other hand, is actually slightly lower in London per head of population.

4.18 However, whilst funding levels are undoubtedly one reason why London has been able to out-perform the rest of the country in terms of absolute transport outcomes (see Section 3.0), it must be recognised that the overall strength and significance of the London economy is such that, in no other part of the country could any Government justify similar levels of expenditure on transport on economic grounds alone. Nevertheless, there are a number of fundamental differences in the way in which transport is funded in the capital, compared to the rest of the country, which merit further consideration.

4.19 In London, TfLs budget is directly negotiated with the Government on a five year planning cycle (along with the ability to raise a precept on Borough council tax bills) whereas elsewhere revenue transport funding forms part of the annual local authority Rate Support Grant settlement, supplemented directly by council tax income. Capital funding comes primarily from the Local Transport Plan settlement, either in the form of cash grants or borrowing approvals through the Integrated Transport and Maintenance 'block' allocations, through the Regional Funding Allocation (RFA) process for major schemes (i.e. above £5m in value) or, for more significant initiatives (e.g. tram schemes, road user charging development) directly from Government, via the Transport Innovation Fund and other sources. We welcome the recently published Lyons proposals allowing local authorities greater flexibility to "place shape" with less control from the centre, and in this, a new local flexibility to set a supplement on the current national business rate.

4.20 Within the Metropolitan areas, the situation is further complicated. Prior to 1990, the PTAs had direct powers to raise revenue income through precepting, and so benefited from this funding being effectively ring fenced to the Authority. However, in the current financial framework the PTA/PTEs are not directly supported, but are instead funded through a levy on the district councils. Although the Metropolitan districts and the PTA do have prudential borrowing powers, London is further advantaged through TfL's ability to access buoyant farebox income, which it has used to finance extensive capital borrowing, through its prudential powers.

4.21 Over the last few years, developer contributions through Section 106 payments have become an increasingly significant source of transport infrastructure funding. As planning authorities, the district councils lead this process, with the PTA/PTEs having little direct influence. Although there is a need to recognise that Section 106 funding is not a solely transport related funding stream, and that increasingly wide calls are being made on such funding (e.g. for affordable housing, education and healthcare facilities), there is a need for transport to feature strongly in the procurement and spending of such income. As such, any future strategic Metropolitan transport authority would need to have a statutory role in this process, for example as highway authority statutory consultee.

4.22 In the London model, TfL also acts as a direct source of capital funding for the Boroughs through the Local Implementation Plan (LIP) process - broadly the equivalent of LTP block allocation funding elsewhere. Although not likely to be a popular move with the districts, implementing a similar arrangement in the conurbations would greatly strengthen the strategic transport authority's ability to control, direct and prioritise expenditure to deliver overall transport outcomes.

4.23 Finally Passenger Transport Authorities do not currently enjoy the general power of well being enjoyed by all purpose local authorities under Section 2 of the Local Government Act 2000, giving them the power to do anything they consider likely to promote the economic, social and environmental well-being of their area. Unlike in non-Metropolitan areas, this potentially limits their ability to radically re-think the nature of the services they provide, and the way in which they fund and deliver them. This point also holds for major infrastructure delivery, which is currently hampered on a conurbation wide basis by issues of scale.

4.24 In summary then, a city region-wide strategic transport authority structure would assist in overcoming this. CfIT believes that, whilst the creation of strategic metropolitan transport authorities would not require fundamental change in funding mechanisms, their effectiveness and ability to deliver could be greatly enhanced by a number of changes, including directly negotiated revenue and capital settlements from central Government (similar to the process now employed to fund TfL); the ability for the strategic transport authority to directly precept for funds through council tax bills (as currently enjoyed by both Police and Fire Authorities); the overall power to coordinate and allocate LTP capital resources, and to delegate revenue transport resources across the conurbation; and; direct enabling 'well-being' powers under Section 2 of the Local Government Act 2000. Government may also consider some sort of incentive to encourage innovative approaches. It will also be vital for the new strategic transport authorities to take a prominent role in the Regional Funding Allocation process.

4.25 The Commission however recognises that the whole subject of local government funding has recently been the subject of a major review being led by Sir Michael Lyons, the finding of which will have a considerable bearing on the whole question of transport funding in the metropolitan areas. We may therefore wish to review the specifics of these recommendations following the recent publication of this review.

Local and regional transport planning

4.26 The Commission's earlier work 'Integrating Transport Delivery Across Government Departments' identified a fundamental difference between strategic policy and/or overall land use and development planning and what we termed 'delivery' or local transport planning. The former we considered needed to continue to engage the broadest possible range of stakeholders (at both a regional and sub-regional level), to ensure that transport continued to be planned as an integral part of wider social, economic and environmental policy planning. The effectiveness of the latter was, however, very much a function of the degree of integration of local transport delivery planning across the 'travel to work areas', regardless of the size or scale of the towns, cities or conurbations involved.

4.27 Although it might have been more usual to have dealt with local transport planning issues before considering funding and functional delivery, arguably this is the one area in which the most progress has been made in the Metropolitan conurbations over the last few years. From the outset, the Department has required all of the Metropolitan conurbations to prepare and implement single Local Transport Plans across their whole areas. Generally this process has been enthusiastically embraced by the conurbation authorities, with joint transport planning and policy units working across the PTEs and district authorities preparing good quality LTP documents. This is reflected in the DfTs own performance assessment for LTP1, where the Met areas performed significantly better than the unitaries in the earlier years, when the assessments were primarily related to the quality of 'plan-making' and programme implementation, but performed worse later on, when assessments focussed more on delivery outcomes (see graph below).

Average LTP/APR Scores - Average Rank

Average LTP/APR Scores - Average Rank

LTP/APR Assessment Scores - Note: In the figure above, a higher rank means a better performance in LTP/APR score, i.e. rank 85 is the best and rank 1 is the worst.

This good strategic planning track record is reinforced in the latest Department for Transport second Local Transport Plan assessments where, out of the six Metropolitan conurbation LTPs: 2 were assessed as 'Excellent'; 3 'Good' and only 1 'Fair'.

4.28 The Commission therefore believes that the development of strategic metropolitan transport authorities would not pose any significant issues for strategic transport planning within the City regions and would, in fact, strengthen the conurbation wide approach to this work.

4.29 Of course, the new strategic transport authority would have to play a full part in the regional transport and spatial planning processes. Whilst responsibility for the Regional Spatial Strategy and through it the Regional Transport Strategy will of course remain with the Regional Assemblies, a strategic transport authority would nevertheless be a major player in the development of the Regional Transport Strategy.

Governance

4.30 There is common agreement that a pre-requisite for the creation of strategic transport authorities in the Metropolitan conurbations (whether as entirely new bodies, or through strengthening the powers and responsibilities of the existing PTA/PTEs) will be the need to strengthen political transport governance on a city region wide basis. Current arrangements draw political representation on the PTAs from the existing district councils. Theoretically this allows Council Leaders and/or other senior cabinet members within the districts to play an active part in the leadership of transport. However frequently the perception is that this does not happen to any great extent, leaving membership of the PTA consisting of primarily back-bench district councillors, and leadership of it somewhat divorced from the rest of local government leadership in the conurbation.

4.31 There are, however, a number of other reasons why the existing governance arrangements are seen as less than ideal. These include the structure and form of the PTAs themselves. Whilst most of the rest of local government has now adopted one or another form of political 'executive' decision-making structure (eg. mayoral or 'leader and cabinet' models), the PTAs continue to function with traditional 'chair and committee' structures, lacking the leadership and ownership that comes from a single person with executive responsibility (ie as in the case of a county or unitary Cabinet Member for Transportation).

4.32 Whilst there are potentially several ways in which such a 'leader' could be appointed (including through public election, election by members of the PTA or appointment by district leaders), upon which it would perhaps be inappropriate for CfIT as a non-political body to express a view, the Commission believes that there needs to be a certain security of tenure to allow any such appointee the ability to make 'tough' political decisions (e.g. a fixed 4 year term, with removal only by motion of no confidence, for example, in a manner similar to the DCLG proposals for local government as a whole in its recent Local Government White Paper). Like the position of Chair of the TfL Board in London, such a position could of course be created independently of other 'pan-city region' civic leadership developments (eg City Region Mayors, 'leader of leader' models etc).

4.33 If such an executive role were to be created, in CfIT's view it would need to be supported by an appropriate 'board' structure, containing both political representation and specialist external appointees, in a manner similar to the present TfL Board (although note, this does not mean to imply that the "leader" would necessarily be a mayoral figure, since even in the London model, the function of Mayor and Chair of the TfL Board are separate and distinct). Taking the London model, the PTA itself could then become the overseeing scrutiny body approving overall policies and budget, but not executive delivery although it would of course need to have the ability to vote on motions of 'no confidence' in the executive leadership of the Authority.

4.34 However, whilst the creation of a single 'transport supremo' type appointment (whether through election or appointment) would undoubtedly improve political accountability, strengthen decision-making ability, and significantly improve governance in the process, CfIT's overall view is that, regardless of changes in future political governance arrangements, it is the creation of a more powerful functional delivery body that will achieve the most in terms of improving governance, accountability and delivery. This is because, even within the existing political arrangements, the creation of a single strategic body with highways and transport management powers across the whole conurbation will, in itself, greatly increase the importance of these roles, leading to higher profile appointments and improved decision-making.

5. Conclusions and recommendations

5.1 Efficient and effective transport networks are fundamental to the continuing prosperity and social well being of our major metropolitan city regions. However, there is mounting evidence that the delivery of transport outcomes in these areas is increasingly lagging behind delivery both in London and the other larger non-metropolitan areas, especially in relation to bus development, traffic growth management, cycling and overall LTP delivery. Supporting the conclusions of the Eddington Review, CfITs research has concluded that there is a direct relationship between the degree of functional integration of local transport delivery and the achievement of results on the ground. The Commission therefore continues to believe that the creation of single 'strategic metropolitan transport authorities' in the major city region conurbations is fundamental to maximising the potential of transport to deliver against the Government's broader social, economic and environmental objectives.

5.2 Creating (or developing the existing PTAs into) strategic transport authorities for the Metropolitan areas will require some form of primary legislation. Although a number of different approaches can be taken, broadly speaking, there are two possible legislative ways to achieve this, either: identifying specific powers in specific Acts of Parliament for certain categories of road and transferring them into a new strategic body incorporating the existing powers of the PTAs, or; creating a new 'upper tier' Strategic Transport Authority in the Metropolitan areas incorporating all of the main local authority transport powers, and then using the principles of subsidiarity to delegate back to the Metropolitan districts decision-making and implementation responsibilities on issues of primarily local significance (for example, road safety & highway maintenance).

5.3 Whilst the former approach is effectively that used in the creation of the Transport for London Road Network, CfIT's view is that in the other metropolitan areas, it would be overly complex to attempt to specify individual powers on individual streets (or categories of streets). Apart from eliminating the ability to tailor a strategic road network to suit the public transport, as well as road traffic management needs of any individual conurbation, such an approach fails to create a clear strategic decision-making hierarchy.

5.4 The Commission is therefore strongly supportive of 'top down' approach that creates a new 'upper tier' Strategic Transport Authority incorporating all of the main local authority highways, traffic and transport powers, and then delegates back to the districts appropriate functions of primarily local significance.

Strategic objectives

5.5 Whilst social and environmental objectives are increasingly important to the Government's overall ambitions in the City Regions, it is economic and social considerations that are most significant with respect to the role and structure of local transport delivery. CfIT therefore believes that congestion management and access to jobs and services should be the overriding objectives upon which the structure of any future strategic Metropolitan transport authority should be developed.

Functional delivery

5.6 CfIT believes that the functionary powers of such a body should include all strategic highways, traffic and transport powers associated with:

5.7 In terms of accessibility, in addition to the above (and the dial-a-ride, concessionary travel, education and social service transport responsibilities already discharged by the existing PTE's on behalf of the districts), this would involve integrating taxi licensing and enforcement, community safety and, potentially, health related transport responsibilities.

Funding

5.8 CfIT believes that, whilst the creation of strategic metropolitan transport authorities would not require fundamental change in funding mechanisms, their effectiveness and ability to deliver could be greatly enhanced by a number of changes, including:

Local and regional transport planning

5.9 Generally the local transport planning process has been enthusiastically embraced by the conurbation authorities, with joint transport planning and policy units working across the PTEs and district authorities preparing good quality LTP documents. This is reflected in the DfT's own performance assessment for LTP1, where the Met areas performed significantly better than the unitiaries in the earlier years, when the assessments were primarily related to the quality of 'plan-making' and programme implementation, but performed worse later on, when assessments focussed more on delivery outcomes. This good strategic planning track record is reinforced in the latest Department for Transport second Local Transport Plan assessments.

5.10 The Commission therefore believes that the development of strategic metropolitan transport authorities would not pose any significant issues for strategic transport planning within the city regions and would, in fact, strengthen the conurbation-wide approach to this work. Whilst responsibility for the Regional Spatial Strategy and through it the Regional Transport Strategy will, of course, remain with the Regional Assembly, a strategic transport authority will be a major player in the development of the Regional Transport Strategy.

Governance

5.11 CfIT's preferred model is for a form of political 'executive' decision-making structure which would benefit from the leadership and ownership that comes from a single person with executive responsibility. Regardless of the ultimate form of any overall city region governance structures, there are potentially several ways in which such a transport leader could be appointed. The Commission however believes that there needs to be a certain security of tenure to allow any such appointee the ability to make 'tough' political decisions.).

5.12 If such an executive role were to be created, in CfIT's view it would need to be supported by an appropriate 'board' structure, containing both political representation and specialist external appointees. Taking the London model, the PTA itself could then become the overseeing scrutiny body approving overall policies and budget, but not executive delivery, although it would of course need to have the ability to vote on motions of 'no confidence' in the executive leadership of the Authority.

5.13 Whilst this would undoubtedly improve political accountability and strengthen decision-making ability, CfIT's overall view is that, regardless of changes in future political governance arrangements, it is the creation of a more powerful functional delivery body that will achieve the most in terms of improving governance, accountability and delivery. This is because, even within the existing political arrangements, the creation of a single strategic body with highways and transport management powers across the whole conurbation will, in itself, greatly increase the importance of these roles, leading to higher profile appointments and improved decision-making.

Broader application of these proposals

5.14 Whilst this analysis has focused particularly on metropolitan areas, it is based on core principles of good transport governance that could and should apply everywhere. For much of the country, including the counties and 'self contained' unitary authorities encompassing the entire 'local transport planning areas' (see our earlier report Integrating Transport Delivery across Government Departments for further definition of this), this is already the case. However, there are clearly some larger non metropolitan areas (generally above 200 000 population), where the local travel planning area is split across a number of unitary and/or county areas where CfIT considers the same principles could potentially apply equally well. Nevertheless, given their importance to the overall UK economy, and the fact that social and environmental returns from reform are also likely to proportionally greater, the Commission believes that in the first instance, any proposals for transport governance reform should be largely focussed in the metropolitan city region areas.

1: For the purposes of this report, all references to "unitaries" should be understood as non-metropolitan.

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